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Article
Retroactive Tax Legislation in view of Article 1 First
Protocol ECHR
Melvin R.T. Pauwels*
One of the principles derived from the rule of law is that laws should not be retroactive. Taking into account that the rule of law is
inherent to the ECHR, the question arises as to how the ECtHR judges retroactive tax legislation. This question is particularly emerging
since retroactive tax legislation is not uncommon in the Member States. This contribution examines in which way the ECtHR tests
retroactive tax legislation for compatibility with Article 1 First Protocol ECHR, and which basic guidelines with respect to the testing of
retroactive tax legislation can be deducted from the case law of the ECtHR.
1 INTRODUCTION
In his famous work ‘The morality of law’ the legal
philosopher Lon L. Fuller formulated eight principles of
legality.1 These principles are derived from ‘the internal
morality of law’. The principles do not regard the
contents of the law – whether the law is fair – but the art
of law making per se. ‘The first observation to be made
is that law is a precondition of good law.’2 One of the
principles is that law should not be retroactive. ‘A
retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with
the governance of human conduct by rules.’3 In the
same line another famous legal philosopher, Joseph Raz,
notes that a condition for law to be obeyed is that it
should be able to guide the behaviour of its subjects. Raz
formulates among others the principle of the rule of law
that laws should prospective and not retrospective.4
Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) has stated that ‘the rule of law, one of the
fundamental principles of a democratic society, is
inherent in all the Articles of the Convention’.5 The
ECtHR has also observed: ‘the principle of legal
certainty, which is necessarily inherent in the law of the
Convention’.6 These considerations of the ECtHR
combined with the aforementioned statements of Fuller
and Raz with respect to retroactivity raise the question
how the ECtHR judges retroactive laws. This question is
particularly emerging with respect to retroactive tax
legislation, since it is far from uncommon that tax
legislation is granted retroactive effect, even where it is
to a taxpayers’ disadvantage.7 This contribution deals
with the subject which standards the ECtHR – as well as
the earlier European Commission of Human Rights
(EComHR) – applies when testing retroactive tax
legislation for compatibility with Article 1 of the First
Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) (hereinafter: Article 1 First Protocol).8
2 SOME METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
2.1 Aim of the Contribution
In his comprehensive study on taxation and the ECHR,
Baker among others dealt with case law of the ECtHR
and the earlier EComHR with respect to retroactive tax
legislation.9 Furthermore, Baker separately discussed* Melvin Pauwels is research affiliate in Tax Law with the Fiscal
Institute of the Tilburg University. His main affiliation is as senior
policy advisor at the tax legislation department of the Netherlands
Ministry of Finance. In 2009, the author obtained his PhD-decree
(with honours) with a thesis on the subject of retroactive tax
legislation, using a legal theory perspective (M.R.T. Pauwels,
Terugwerkende kracht van belastingwetgeving: gewikt en gewogen
[Retroactivity of tax legislation: weighing and balancing],
(Amersfoort, Sdu Uitgevers, 2009)). This contribution, which is
written in his personal capacity, is partly based on the analysis in
the Ph.D-thesis. The author would like to thank Hans Gribnau and
Daniël Smit for their comments. The author can be contacted at
melvinpauwels@gmail.com.
1 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1969), pp. 33–94.
2 Fuller 1969, p. 155.
3 Fuller 1969, p. 53.
4 Joseph Raz, ‘The rule of law and its virtue’, Law Quarterly Review
(1977), pp. 195–211.
5 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 23 November 2000, no. 25701/94, The
former King of Greece and Others v. Greece, para. 79. See also
ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96, Broniowski
v. Poland, para. 147.
6 ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium, para. 58.
According to the ECtHR the principle of legal certainty is
connected to the principle of the rule of law; e.g., ECtHR 27
September 2011, no. 7359/06, Agurdino S.R.L. v. Moldova, para.
25.
7 See Hans Gribnau and Melvin Pauwels, ‘General report’, in: Hans
Gribnau and Melvin Pauwels (eds.), Retroactivity in Tax Law, EATLP
International Tax Series no. 9, (IBFD 2013), pp. 41–68.
8 So, I do not take into consideration the case law of the courts in
the various Member States. In this respect I note that, except for
France and the Netherlands, the national courts do not often test
retroactive tax legislation against Art. 1 First Protocol, but test it
against the national Constitution; see Gribnau/Pauwels 2013,
General report, p. 62.
9 P. Baker, ‘Taxation and the European Convention on Human





268 EC TAX REVIEW 2013/6
©2013 Kluwer Law International BV,The Netherlands
that subject in a contribution in British Tax Review some
years later.10 The question therefore arises: why now a
contribution on the issue of retroactive tax legislation
and the ECHR again? The first reason is that there have
been new relevant cases of the ECtHR since the last
contribution of Baker in 2005.11 Second, my
contribution takes another approach. Baker discussed
the issue of retroactive tax legislation and the ECHR
mainly by discussing case-by-case the judgments of the
ECtHR. Obviously, this approach is appropriate because
the ECtHR decides case-by-case and because one should
be very reluctant to generalize a judgment of the ECtHR
in a particular case. Nonetheless, this contribution seeks
to deduct some basic guidelines from the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR on retroactive tax legislation. Therefore, in
this contribution, the focus is not on the details of the
various cases, but both on the method used by the
ECtHR to examine retroactive tax legislation and on the
considerations of the ECtHR that might have a more
general scope. I think this approach could have added
value besides (not: instead of) the case-by-case analysis.
After all, not only the ECtHR but also – actually: in the
first place – national courts have to apply the ECHR
when a taxpayer claims that retroactive taxation
infringes rights protected by the ECHR. So, a more
general framework of which limits the ECHR sets with
respect to retroactive taxation could help the national
courts. Moreover, a general framework could also be
helpful for the national tax legislators (so that a legislator
knows which ECHR-limits it should take into account
where it considers to introduce tax legislation with
retroactive effect) and for the taxpayers and their lawyers
(so that they can better estimate their success chances
when considering to start legal proceedings to contest
retroactive tax legislation).
2.2 Research Questions
This contribution seeks to find answers to the following
two research questions:
(1) in which way does the ECtHR’s assessment of
retroactive tax legislation in a specific case fit within
the general framework that the ECtHR uses to assess
measures for compatibility with Article 1 First
Protocol?
(2) which basic guidelines with respect to retroactive
tax legislation can be deducted from the case law of
the ECtHR?
It should be noted that this contribution does not
discuss the issue of retroactivity of case law (judicial law
making) in the field of taxation.12 Furthermore, the
contribution only focuses on retroactive tax legislation
that is to the taxpayers’ disadvantage.
2.3 Cases Analysed
A challenging issue when studying a subject concerning
the application of the ECHR is that there is an
overwhelming number of judgments and decisions of
the ECtHR and of the earlier EComHR. As a
consequence, it could well be that a judgment that is
relevant for the subject analysed, has not been taken into
account in the analysis, because that judgment is – for
whatever reason – overlooked. Therefore, I think it is
appropriate to account which judgments and decisions
of the ECtHR and of the former EComHR with respect
to retroactive tax legislation have been analysed to
answer the aforementioned two research questions.
These cases are A, B, C, and D; Building Societies; M.A.;
the two Di Belmonte cases; and Joubert.13 Furthermore,
also the three recent cases – NKM, Gáll and R.Sz – with
respect to the Hungarian 98% tax on severance
payments have been taken into account, although not all
three cases concern genuine retroactive taxation.14 Non-
tax cases with respect to retroactivity are only discussed
if relevant.
Some tax cases are not discussed in this contribution.
In his contribution on retroactive tax legislation, Baker
also mentions the Voggenberger case a retroactive tax
case.15 However, here, I do not deal with that case
because in my opinion the EComHR did not judge on
an issue of retroactivity in that case.16 Also, the
Peeters, ‘The Protection of the Right to Property in Article 1 of the
First Protocol to the European Human Rights Convention Limiting
the Fiscal Power of States’, in: L. Hinnekens (ed.), Festschrift
Vanistendael, (Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer Law International,
2008), pp. 679–701.
10 P. Baker, ‘Retroactive tax legislation and the European convention
on human rights’, British Tax Review (2005), pp. 1–9.
11 Note that most of these cases have been included in the series on
decisions of the ECtHR on tax matters by Baker in European
Taxation.
12 See on that issue e.g., ECtHR 7 July 2011, no. 39766/05, Serkov v.
Ukraine, and ECtHR 20 September 2011, no. 14902/04, OAO
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, paras 567–575.
13 EComHR 10 March 1981, no. 8531/79, A., B., C. and D. v. The
United Kingdom; ECtRM 23 October 1997, no. 21319/93, 21449/
93 and 21675/93, National & Provincial Building Society, the
Leeds Permanent Building Society and the Yorkshire Building
Society v. the United Kingdom; ECtRM (decision) 10 June 2003,
no. 27793/95, M.A. and 34 Others v. Finland; ECtRM (decision) 3
June 2004, no. 72665/01, Di Belmonte (no. 2) v. Italy; ECtRM 16
maart 2010, nr. 72638/01, Di Belmonte v. Italy; ECtHR 23 July
2009, no. 30345/05, Joubert v. France.
14 ECtRM 14 May 2013, no. 66529/11, N.K.M. v. Hungary; ECtRM
25 June 2013, no. 49570/11, Gáll v. Hungary; and ECtRM 2 July
2013, no. 41838/11, R.Sz. v. Hungary.
15 Baker 2005, p. 4; EComHR 12 October 1994, no. 21294/93,
Voggenberger Transport GmbH v. Austria.
16 In my view, the issue at hand in the Voggenberger case was not
retroactivity but whether the tax decisions had sufficient legal basis
in the law then applicable. The applicant company had
complained that the decisions of the Austrian authorities with
respect to the years 1986–1988 were unlawful, arguing that these
could not be based on the provision which was in force before an
amendment of 1 August 1988. The Austrian Courts however
upheld the position the tax authorities had taken that their
interpretation of the provision concerned did not go beyond the
wording which it had before the amendment, containing simply a
clarification. The EComHR rejected the applicant’s complaints that
the decisions of the Austrian authorities were contrary to domestic
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Agurdino case is not discussed, notwithstanding that
retroactive tax legislation is involved.17 The reason is
that, in this case, not the retroactive tax legislation itself
was scrutinized by the ECtHR. The case is, in the main,
an example of the application of the principle of res
judicata (the principle of finality of judgments).18 The
case confirms that the introduction of retroactive (tax)
legislation – irrespective whether the retroactive
legislation itself is permissible – is not a legitimate
reason to review, let alone to quash, a final court
judgment.19 Furthermore, in this contribution, the
Optim case is only briefly discussed, although
retroactive tax legislation is involved. The reason for this
is that in this case the ECtHR does not get round the
issue of retroactivity, as it considers that Article 1 First
Protocol is not applicable (see section 5.2).20
3 ON TERMINOLOGY
3.1 Retroactive versus Retrospective
Before analysing the issue of retroactivity as regards
content, the terminology used should be made clear.
The reason is that, in the literature as well as in case law,
different concepts are used with various meanings when
dealing with the phenomenon of retroactivity in
legislation.21 In the English language a potential
misunderstanding may arise when using the concepts of
retroactivity and retrospectivity. These concepts are
sometimes (implicitly) considered synonyms or
interchangeable, but other times a conceptual distinction
is made. Moreover, even if a conceptual distinction is
made, the meaning of retroactivity and retrospectivity
may not be the same in the various countries and legal
discourses in which English is spoken or used. It may be
the case that where a legal provision is applicable to facts
prior to its enactment, this is called ‘retroactive’ in the
one country, while it is called ‘retrospective’ in another
country.22 It seems that also the ECtHR is not consistent
when practising these concepts or at least uses the
concepts interchangeably. Where a tax provision is
applicable to a taxable event occurred prior to its
enactment, the ECtHR employs both the term
‘retroactivity’23 and the term ‘retrospectivity’.24 For sake
of clarity, in this contribution the term ‘retroactivity’ is
used for that situation. This is in line with Bobbett’s
proposal for consistent use in terminology.25 The
situation that a tax provision does not have retroactive
effect but has immediate effect without grandfathering
existing situations (e.g., a new rule denying deduction of
certain interest costs incurred after the enactment,
without grandfathering interest on the loans that were
provided prior to the enactment) could be called
retrospective. However, in this contribution, the focus is
in the main on retroactive laws.
3.2 Concept of Retroactivity
Even if it is agreed on to use the term ‘retroactive’ for the
situation in which a legislative provision is applicable to
events occurred prior to the enactment, it still may be
unclear what exactly the concept of retroactivity
involves.26 For example the aforementioned Fuller has a
remarkable opinion with respect to retroactivity in tax
law:
Contrast with the ex post facto criminal statute a tax law
first enacted, let us say, in 1963 imposing a tax on financial
gains realized in 1960 at a time when such gains were not
yet subject to tax. Such a statute may be grossly unjust, but
it cannot be said that it is, strictly, speaking retroactive. To
be sure, it bases the amount of the tax on something that
happened in the past. But the only act it requires of its
addressee is a very simple one, namely, that he pays the tax
demanded. This requirement operates prospectively. We do
not, in other words, enact tax laws today that order a man
to have paid taxes yesterday, though we may pass today a
law. So, the decisions were upheld on the basis of a certain
interpretation of the provision applicable in the years concerned
and not on the basis of the later amendment (in which case there
would indeed have been retroactive application).
17 ECtHR 27 September 2011, no. 7359/06, Agurdino S.R.L. v.
Moldova.
18 In this case, after enacting retroactive legislation interpreting a tax
rule in a way different than the Supreme Court did, the Moldovan
tax authorities asked the Supreme Court to review a previous
judgment of three years before. The Moldovan Supreme Court
granted the request and subsequently quashed its previous
judgment. The ECtHR concluded that there was a violation of both
Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 1 First Protocol.
19 See also Philip Baker, ‘Some Recent Decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights on Tax Matters’, European Taxation (2012),
pp. 308–309.
20 ECtHR (decision) 11 September 2012, no. 23819/06, Optim &
Industerre v. Belgium.
21 See in this regard amongst others Catherine S. Bobbett, ‘Retroactive
or retrospective? A note on terminology’, British Tax Review (2006),
pp. 15–18, Pauwels 2009, Chapter 2, and Gribnau/Pauwels 2013,
General report, pp. 42–44.
22 Bobbett 2006. See also E. Edinger, ‘Retrospectivity in law’,
University of British Columbia Law Review (1995), p. 10, G.T.
Loomer, ‘Taxing out of time: parliamentary supremacy and
retroactive tax legislation’, British Tax Review (2006), pp. 65–66,
and B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law, (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 5–13.
23 E.g., Building Societies; M.A.; R.Sz.
24 E.g., A, B, C, and D; Building Societies; M.A.
25 Bobbett 2006.
26 More in general about the difficulty to find a proper definition and
demarcation of the concept of retroactivity see e.g., J.G. Laitos,
‘Legislative retroactivity’, Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
(1997), pp. 132–133, J.E. Fisch, ‘Retroactivity and legal change: an
equilibrium approach’, Harvard Law Review (1997), pp.
1067–1070, D.E. Troy, ‘Toward a definition and critique of
retroactivity’, Alabama Law Review (2000), pp. 1329–1353, C.
Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law, (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. 9–37, and Juan Vega Gómez,
‘Retroactive Application of Laws and the Rule of Law’, in: Imer B.
Flores an Kenneth Einar Himma (ed.), Law, Liberty, and the Rule of
Law, (Dordrecht, Springer, 2012), pp. 175–188, as well as Fuller
1969, who notes (p. 59): ‘there remains for examination the most
difficult problem of all, that of knowing when an enactment should
properly be regarded as retrospective’.
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tax law that determines the levy to be imposed on the basis
of events occurring in the past.27
So, Fuller’s view implies that there is only retroactivity
in the field of tax law if a tax act is enacted that demands
that taxes should have been paid in the past. I think that
not many tax scholars nowadays agree with Fuller’s
view.28 Most tax scholars (and undoubtedly also most
taxpayers) would agree that a 2013 tax act imposing tax
on financial gains realized in 2010 is an obvious
example of retroactivity. Not the moment on which tax
is paid or should have been paid is relevant. In my view,
the key issue for the label ‘retroactive taxation’ is
whether or not the key event (income earned, expenses
incurred, transaction executed, etc.) to which the tax
law attaches consequences (hereinafter: taxable event)
occurred prior to the enactment. There is no indication
that the ECtHR follows Fuller’s approach. An example
to the contrary is the M.A. case, in which due to a law
enacted in December 1994 a capital gain with the sale of
stock options on 7 November 1994 was taxed at a
higher rate than the tax rate that was applicable at the
moment of the sale. The ECtHR considered this as
retroactive taxation. Also from other cases of the ECtHR
it can be deducted that the relevant moment is the
moment on which the taxable event occurred (and not
the moment of the tax payment).29
However, even if it is agreed on that the taxable event
should be the central issue, there are still some
ambiguities with the concept of retroactive taxation. One
of the issues is whether an income tax provision that is
enacted on a certain moment in a pending tax period
(e.g., on 15 November 2013) and is applicable to
taxable events occurred after the start of that tax period
(e.g., 1 January 2013) should be qualified as
retroactive.30 In some countries such a provision would
indeed be considered retroactive, based on the reasoning
that the provision applies with respect to a period prior
to the enactment and/or that the provision also applies
to taxable events that occurred prior to the enactment.
However, there are also many countries in which such a
provision would not be considered retroactive. In that
approach, the basic idea is in essence that the taxable
event of period-related taxes (such as the income tax)
only arises at the end of the period. To my knowledge,
the ECtHR has not clearly decided which approach is in
its opinion correct. However, from case law it can be
deducted that in any event the first-mentioned view is
apparently not principally rejected.31 Moreover, taking
into account the different views in the various Member
States, I expect that the ECtHR will not take up an
explicit position on this issue. Moreover, there is no
urging reason for the ECtHR to take a position – neither
if it is asked to do that by an applicant or government –,
since the question whether or not a tax law is genuinely
retroactive, is not decisive for the issue whether or not
contested taxation is compatible with Article 1 First
Protocol.32 It is also important whether or not legitimate
expectations of the taxpayer are infringed. To address
this latter issue it is not necessary that the contested
taxation is retroactive. After all, also in case of non-
retroactivity but immediate application of the law
without grandfathering (retrospectivity) legitimate
expectations could be at stake.33 This could be taken
into consideration under the fair balance test. So,
concluding, in cases in which it is unclear whether the
qualification retroactivity is appropriate, the ECtHR has
the possibility to simply jump over the issue and to turn
to the fair balance test.
It should be noted that the approach in which the
moment the taxable event occurs is decisive for the
labelling retroactive or not, may not always have
satisfying results. First, a legislator may artificially
construe a taxable event that strictly legally occurs after
the enactment (thus the statute is de jure prospective),
but that in essence involves an event that occurred in
the past (thus the statute is de facto retroactive).34 In
such (extreme) situations, I think a substance over form
approach should be applied, thus judging the statute
like it is retroactive.35 Secondly, it may happen that the
event that is legally the key event does not correspond
with the event that is socially or economically considered
the key event, and therefore the moments on which
these events occur may not coincide in time. Sometimes
the ECtHR just simply jumps over the issue whether or
not the label ‘retroactive’ is appropriate. An example is
the Di Belmonte case. In this case, the applicant had
received compensation for expropriation which was
27 Fuller 1969, p. 59.
28 See e.g., also Sampford 2006, pp. 19–21, Juratowitch 2008, pp.
16–17, Pauwels 2009, pp. 45–46 and Vega Gómez 2012, pp.
182–183. However, J. Waldron, ‘Retroactive law: how dodgy was
Duynhoven’, Otago Law Review 2004, p. 632, seems to have a
position in line with Fuller’s position.
29 E.g., NKM and Gáll.
30 Gribnau/Pauwels 2013, General report, p. 46.
31 Compare the situation in the case of M.A.
32 It should be noted that in the field of penal law the issue whether
or not a statute is retroactive is a matter of the greatest importance,
since Art,. 7 ECHR prohibits the retroactive application of the
criminal law where it is to an accused’s disadvantage. In that
respect the case ECtHR 29 March 2006, no. 67335/01, Achour v.
France is important. In that borderline case the Grand Chamber
applied – deviating from the Chamber’s judgment – a narrow
definition of retroactivity, among others considering (para. 59): ‘the
practice of taking past events into consideration should be
distinguished from the notion of retrospective application of the
law, stricto sensu’.
33 See e.g., the NKM case and the Gáll case as well as e.g., the non-tax
case ECtHR 12 October 2004, no. 60669/00, Kjartan Ásmundsson
v. Iceland, para. 44. See more in general on this subject P. Popelier,
‘Legitimate expectations and the law maker in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights’, European Human Rights Law
Review (2006), pp. 20–21.
34 See P. Popelier, Toepassing van de wet in de tijd [Application of the
law in time], (Brussels, Story-Scientia, 1999), p. 31 about possible
manipulation by the legislator. See for an example also Fuller
1969, p. 62.
35 Pauwels 2009, pp. 105–106 and 308–309.
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subject to a tax. According to the applicant, this taxation
involved retroactive taxation because the tax statute
concerned was introduced after the expropriation and
after the amount of compensation was established by a
final decision of the local court. However, the Italian
government took the position that there was no
retroactive taxation, because the tax statute was enacted
before the compensation tranches were paid. The
government argued that the legally decisive moment for
taxation is the moment of receipt of the income. The
ECtHR decided not to take a position on this issue by
considering (paragraph 42) ‘En tout état de cause, une
éventuelle application rétroactive ( . . . ) au cas du
requérant n’aurait pas constitué per se une violation de
l’article 1 du Protocole no 1 ( . . . )’, and subsequently
turned to the fair balance test. A comparable example is
the recent Gáll case. In that case, an amendment
introducing a 98% tax on severance payments was
enacted after the applicant’s dismissal but before the
severance was paid (which is the legally relevant event).
The ECtHR only implicitly noted that there was no
genuine retroactivity, and moreover it subsequently
considered that (paragraph 51) ‘the taxation complained
of can be argued to have certain retroactive features. In
particular, the severance itself was generated on the
applicant’s dismissal ( . . . ) – which preceded the entry
into force of the final amendment ( . . . )’.36 Also in this
case, the ECtHR subsequently rather focuses on the
contents, i.e., the fair balance test, than on the labelling
issue whether or not there is a case of retroactivity. For
clarity’s sake, I note that, starting from the definitions
provided in section 3.1, in both the Di Belmonte case
and the Gáll case there is no retroactivity but
retrospectivity.
4 GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR TESTING FOR
COMPATIBILITY WITH ARTICLE 1 FIRST
PROTOCOL
Article 1 First Protocol reads as follows:
Protection of property
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.
When an applicant argues for a competent court that a
certain measure violates Article 1 First Protocol, the
court should examine several issues. In a nutshell, the
following five steps can be deducted from the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.37
First of all, it should be established that Article 1 First
Protocol is ratione materiae applicable to the case at
hand.38 In that respect it should first be analysed
whether there are ‘possessions’ within the meaning of
Article 1 First Protocol (step 1). If that is the case, next,
it should be established that the contested measure
interferes with the right to peaceful enjoyment of these
possessions (step 2). If there are no possessions or there
is no interference, the applicant cannot invoke the
protection of Article 1 First Protocol.
If it is established that there is an interference with
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, it should
subsequently be examined whether the interference is in
compliance with Article 1 First Protocol. In that respect
the interference should meet three requirements. These
requirements are cumulative. So, if one of these
requirements is not met, the interference is held to
violate Article 1 First Protocol.
The first requirement is that the interference should
be lawful (step 3). Above all, the lawfulness test requires
the existence of a legal basis in domestic law for the
interference (principle of legality). Furthermore, the
legal basis must have a certain quality. This relates to
the notion of the rule of law. Among others, the
applicable provisions in the domestic law should be
sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their
application.
The second requirement is that the interference
should pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest
(step 4). In that connection, the national authorities
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. In the tax sphere,
the margin of appreciation is even ‘wide’. Furthermore,
the notion of ‘public interest’ is interpreted extensively.
The third requirement is that the interference must
strike a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights
(step 5). This is the proportionality test. There must be a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realized by
the impugned measure. In assessing whether the fair
balance requirement has been met, it is recognized that a
state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in the area of
taxation; the ECtHR respects the legislature’s assessment
in such matters unless it is devoid of a reasonable
foundation. The fair balance requirement is not satisfied
if the interference constitutes an individual and
excessive burden.
36 Compare also NKM, para. 52.
37 See e.g., the NKM case, and the non-tax case ECtHR (Grand
Chamber) 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96, Broniowski v. Poland.
38 Obviously, it is also necessary that the case at hand falls under the
jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione loci and ratione temporis.
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5 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO RETROACTIVE TAX
LEGISLATION
5.1 Introduction
In this section, it is examined how the ECtHR
scrutinizes retroactive tax legislation for compatibility
with Article 1 First Protocol. In this section, there are
regularly references to the M.A. case. The central
position of this case may seem odd, as this case only
concerns a ‘decision’ (holding that the application is
inadmissible) in which it was concluded that the
complaint that the retroactive taxation infringes Article 1
First Protocol is ‘manifestly ill-founded’. Nevertheless,
the M.A. case seems to be one of the leading cases with
respect to retroactive tax legislation.39 First of all, in this
case, the ECtHR provides some considerations which
potentially have a more general scope. Secondly, the
ECtHR frequently refers to the M.A. case in other
cases.40 Another leading case is the Building Societies
case. This case is also discussed in section 6 regarding
the particular situation of legislative intervention.
As I regularly refer to the M.A. case, I will now first
briefly describe the main details of the case. In this case,
the Finnish tax legislator had amended a tax statute as a
result of which profits based on appreciation of stock
received by an employee from his employer were to be
regarded as a benefit related to employment for tax
purposes instead of as lower-taxed capital income (as it
was regarded before). This amendment was adopted on
21 December 1994 and published on 31 December
1994. Because during parliamentary proceedings it had
became known that certain companies were planning to
bring forward the opportunity to exercise the stock
options in order to avoid the application of the new law,
the Finnish legislator provided retroactive effect to the
amendment until 16 September 1994, which is the date
of the introduction of the bill in parliament. However,
the so-called pure cases (i.e., cases in which the
company had not initiated arrangements with the aim of
making possible an earlier exercise of the options) were
left outside of the scope of the retroactivity. In the case of
M.A. the applicants had exercised their stock options by
selling them on 7 November 1994 after the stock option
arrangements had been changed. Thus, not being a pure
case, the retroactive amendment was applicable to the
gain the applicants made. This retroactive taxation was
upheld by the ECtHR.
5.2 Interference with the Peaceful Enjoyment
of Possessions
In tax cases, the first two steps regarding the scope
ratione materiae of Article 1 First Protocol – whether
there is an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions – usually are not a problem. It follows from
the structure of Article 1 First Protocol that taxation falls
under that scope. After all, in the third sentence a
reservation is made with respect to taxes, which
indicates that taxation is in principle considered an
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.41 In the Burden case it was reasoned as
follows: ‘Taxation is in principle an interference with the
right guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, since it deprives the person concerned of
a possession, namely the amount of money which must
be paid.’42 Also in case the tax is not due by the taxpayer
himself, but is withheld by another on payments to the
taxpayer, Article 1 First Protocol is applicable.43 So, one
could conclude that in cases in which the application of
a substantive tax provision is contested, Article 1 First
Protocol is in principle always applicable, since taxes
inherently – by their nature – interfere with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions. Taking into account the
aforementioned, it is not a surprise that also in cases
involving retroactive taxation the ECtHR readily accepts
that Article 1 First Protocol is applicable, sometimes
even without explicitly considering whether there is an
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.44
However, sometimes, for example in the Building
Societies case and the Joubert case, the ECtHR takes
another approach and examines whether there is a
legitimate expectation – constituting possessions – that
the disputed tax would be repaid.45 In this contribution,
I do not elaborate on the emerging issue why and in
which kind of tax cases the ECtHR applies such another
approach.
I do however note that in tax cases in which the
ECtHR does examine thoroughly whether there are
possessions in the meaning of Article 1 First Protocol,
the case at hand does often not concern a substantive tax
dispute but involves procedural aspects of taxation.46
39 Compare also the concurring opinion in the NKM case.
40 E.g., Di Belmonte (no. 2); Di Belmonte; ECtHR 23 February 2006,
no. 25632/02, Stere and others v. Romania; ECtHR 22 January
2009, no. 3991/03, Bulves AD v. Bulgaria; NKM; R.Sz; and the
non-tax case ECtHR 18 May 2010, no. 16021/02, Plalam S.P.A. v.
Italy.
41 Compare ECtHR 23 October 1990, no. 11581/85, Darby v.
Sweden, para. 30: ‘Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, second paragraph,
establishes that the duty to pay tax falls within its field of
application’.
42 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 29 April 2008, no. 13378/05, Burden v.
the United Kingdom, para. 58; see also ECtHR (decision) 4 January
2008, nos. 25834/05 and 27815/05, Imbert de Tremiolles v.
France.
43 Di Belmonte, para. 38. See also, however only after extensive
considerations, NKM, paras 32–45.
44 A.B.C. and D.; Di Belmonte (no. 2); M.A.; Di Belmonte; R.Sz.
45 Building Societies, paras 62–70; Joubert, paras 50–53.
46 E.g., ECtHR 16 April 2002, no. 36677/97, S.A. Dangeville v.
France, paras 44–48.
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One of these cases is the Optim case.47 In this case, the
Belgium legislator enacted a law establishing that a
provisional assessment did suspend the operation of a
limitation period, subsequent to deviating judgment of
the Belgium Supreme Court. The applicants challenged
this law, among others in particular the retroactive effect
of it. However, according to the ECtHR, although the
applicants had legitimate expectations that the limitation
period would operate to bar recovery of tax, the change
of the tax law did not imply a deprivation of a
possession within the meaning of Article 1 First
Protocol.
To conclude, if the retroactivity concerns a
substantive tax rule, the first two steps – whether there
is an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions – can in principle be passed by easily.
However, if the retroactivity regards a procedural tax
rule, it should be carefully examined whether in the case
at hand there is an interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of Article
1 First Protocol.
5.3 Lawfulness of the Interference
5.3.1 Legal Basis
The requirement that the interference has a legal basis in
domestic law is in principle met in case of retroactive
taxation. After all, the fact that the legislator granted
retroactive effect to the legislation concerned, does not
alter the fact that the taxation, including the retroactive
element, has a legal basis in the legislation concerned.
Obviously, if the legislation concerned was not granted
retroactive effect but the authorities nonetheless applied
the legislation retroactively, the lawfulness requirement
is in principle not met.48 However, in that case there is
no issue of retroactivity of tax legislation but an issue
that the tax authorities applied the legislation beyond its
temporal field of application, thus without legal basis in
that legislation.
5.3.2 Quality of the Legal Basis (I): Accessible and Precise
The requirement of lawfulness also implies that the legal
norms concerned are sufficiently accessible and precise.
Retroactive taxation as such is not incompatible with
these two requirements. Provided that the legislation
with retroactive effect was published in an appropriate
way, the legislation meets the requirement that the
applicable legal norm is sufficiently accessible.
Furthermore, provided that it is clear from the
legislation that retroactive effect is granted, also the
requirement that the legal norm is sufficiently precise is
met (as far as it concerns the retroactivity).
5.3.3 Quality of the Legal Basis (II): Foreseeable
In my opinion, the most emerging element of the
lawfulness test with respect to retroactive taxation is the
requirement that the legal norm concerned should be
foreseeable in its application. As mentioned above this
element is closely linked to the notion of the rule of law.
One might expect there is at least a substantial
tension between retroactive tax legislation and the
requirement that law should be foreseeable in its
application. Moreover, one would also expect this,
taking into account case law regarding the lawfulness
requirement. For example, in the (non-tax) Rekvényi
case, the ECtHR considered with reference to the famous
(non-tax) Sunday Times case:
According to the Court’s well-established case-law, one of
the requirements flowing from the expression ‘prescribed
by law’ is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as
a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able
– if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail.49
Similarly, in the (non-tax) Laskey case, it was stated that
‘individuals should be able to regulate their conduct
with reference to the norms prevailing in the society in
which they live. ( . . . ) an individual must be able to
foresee the consequences of this actions ( . . . )’.50 Both
quotations show that the Strasbourg court links up a
close connection between the foreseeability requirement
and the notion that an individual should be able to
foresee the legal consequences of an action. In my view,
the latter implies that legislation should be prospective.
As a consequence, one might expect that retroactive
legislation would not satisfy the foreseeability
requirement, and thus would not be regarded lawful.
However, surprisingly, up until now, the ECtHR has
not clearly tested retroactive tax legislation against the
foreseeability requirement under the lawfulness test. A
fine example is the above described M.A. case. One of
the arguments of the applicants was ‘that the
retrospective legislation does not fulfil the requirements
of lawfulness in respect of foreseeability’. However, in
spite of this argument, the ECtHR did not explicitly
consider the foreseeability requirement under the
lawfulness test, but it almost directly went to the fair
balance test. And under that test the ECtHR considered
that:
47 ECtHR (decision) 11 September 2012, no. 23819/06, Optim &
Industerre v. Belgium. See on this case also Philip Baker, ‘Recent
Tax Cases of the European Court of Human Rights’, European
Taxation (2012), p. 586.
48 See e.g., the non-tax case ECtHR 8 November 2005, no. 63134/00,
Kechko v. Ukraine.
49 ECtHR 20 May 1999, no. 25390/94, Rekvényi v. Hungary, para.
34; ECtHR 26 April 1979, The Sunday Times v. The United
Kingdom, no. 6538/74, para. 49.
50 ECommHR 14 December 1992, nos. 21627/93, 21628/93 and
21974/93, Laskey and others v. The United Kingdom.
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the fact that the legislation applied retroactively in the
applicants’ case [does not; MP] constitute per se a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as retrospective tax
legislation is not as such prohibited by that provision. The
question to be answered is whether, in the applicants’
specific circumstances, the retrospective application of the
law imposed an unreasonable burden on them and thereby
failed to strike a fair balance between the various interests
involved.
In the case of M.A. the ECtHR concluded that this fair
balance test was met and that there was no violation of
Article 1 First Protocol. Taking into account this
conclusion, one can deduct that the ECtHR is apparently
of the opinion that the retroactive tax legislation at hand
was not incompatible with the lawfulness requirement.
However, it remains unclear what the legal reasoning of
the ECtHR is with respect to the foreseeability
requirement under the lawfulness test. Also in other
cases concerning retroactive tax legislation, the ECtHR
does not explicitly examine whether the application of
the retroactive legislation satisfies this requirement
under the lawfulness test51 or just considers that the
lawfulness test is met.52
The question arises as to what the explanation for this
approach of the ECtHR is. I think there are two possible
explanations, which might converge.
First, the following could be argued. It should be
noted that the above quotations of the ECtHR with
respect to the foreseeability requirement (holding that an
individual must be able to foresee the consequences of
his actions) are done in the context of ‘normal’
legislation, i.e., legislation that is prospective. It might
be that the foreseeability requirement and its objective
should be understood differently in the context of
retroactive legislation. In that respect it should be
repeated that the requirement implies that ‘the legal
norms should be sufficiently ( . . . ) foreseeable in their
application’. One could argue that in the context of
retroactive legislation this requirement only53 implies
that it should be clear for the taxpayer on the basis of
the legislation concerned that the legislation will be
applied retroactively by the tax authorities. So, after the
enactment, the taxpayer should be able to foresee on the
basis of the legislation concerned that the tax authorities
will apply the legislation retroactively. If the taxpayer
cannot clearly deduct from the legislation that the
legislation has retroactive effect, the foreseeability
requirement is not satisfied. Obviously, if the afore-
suggested reasoning would be correct, this would imply
a rather narrow interpretation of the foreseeability
requirement under the lawfulness test. In this
interpretation the key issue is not whether the taxpayer
could foresee the legal consequences of considered
actions. The key issue would only be whether the
taxpayer could foresee the actions of the tax authorities.
In case of prospective legislation the latter issue would
in principle also cover the former issue, but in the
special case of retroactive legislation these issues do not
correspond.
A second explanation might be the following. This
explanation relates to the fact that it follows from the
general framework of the ECtHR (see section 4 above)
that if the lawfulness requirement is not met in a certain
case, the conclusion should be that Article 1 First
Protocol is violated. So, there is strictly speaking no
room for a balancing test in that case, for example
balancing with the public interest aimed by the measure.
Against this background, it might be that the ECtHR
found that the foreseeability requirement under the
lawfulness test is too strict to examine whether
retroactive tax legislation is compatible with Article 1
First Protocol. It might for example be that in a case of
retroactive tax legislation strictly speaking the
foreseeability requirement is not satisfied due to the
retroactivity (as the individual could not foresee the
consequences of this actions), but that there are weighty
reasons for the retroactivity (e.g., targeting tax
avoidance). However, under the lawfulness test, there
would be no room to balance the infringement of the
foreseeability requirement against these weighty reasons.
This would thus have the result that, although there is a
sufficient justification for the retroactivity, the decision
should be that there is a violation of Article 1 First
Protocol. Such a result would, at least in my opinion,
not be desirable, as assessing retroactivity should be
based on a balancing test.54 Therefore, it could be that
the ECtHR found that it is more appropriate to examine
retroactive legislation under the fair balance test. Under
this test, also the interest that an individual should be
able to foresee the consequences of his actions could be
taken into consideration. This element of foreseeability
is often related to the concept of legitimate expectations.
Obviously, the two above-mentioned possible
explanations have a highly speculative nature. Preferably,
the ECtHR should clearly explain the relation between
51 See A.B.C. and D; Building Societies, paras 78–83. Compare also
the cases of Di Belmonte (no. 2) and Di Belmonte, although these
cases do strictly speaking not concern genuine retroactivity. See
also the following non-tax cases: ECtHR 9 December 1994, no.
13427/87, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece;
ECtHR 20 November 1995, no. 17849/91, Pressos Compania
Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium; and ECtHR 11 April 2002, no.
46356/99, Smokovitis and others v. Greece.
52 E.g., Joubert, para. 56.
53 Obviously, the substantive rule concerned (to which retroactive
effect is granted) should also meet the qualitive lawfulness
requirements such as the foreseeability requirement.
54 See for the author’s view Pauwels 2009 and Melvin Pauwels,
‘Retroactive and retrospective tax legislation: a principle based
approach’, in: Gribnau/Pauwels 2013, pp. 95–116. Compare also
e.g., Popelier 1999, J. Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC
Law, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2003), M. Schuver-Bravenboer, Fiscaal Overgangsbeleid [Tax
transition policy], (Deventer, Kluwer, 2009) and Johanna Hey,
‘Legislation ‘by’ press release: the role of announcements in the
debate about retroactive tax legislation’, in: Gribnau/Pauwels 2013,
pp. 129–138.
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retroactive (tax) legislation and the foreseeable
requirement under the lawfulness test.
To end, in the three recent cases with respect to the
Hungarian 98% tax on severance payments, surprisingly,
the ECtHR gave some considerations about retroactivity
under the lawfulness test. Taking into account the earlier
case law, this is noteworthy in itself. However, in the
end, the ECtHR does not reach a final conclusion with
the retroactivity concerned under the lawfulness test but
shifts the issue to the proportionality test.55 Therefore, in
my opinion, one should be reluctant to deduce from
these cases that the ECtHR has adopted a new approach
by testing retroactivity also against the lawfulness
requirement.
5.4 Legitimate Aim in the Public Interest
The second requirement is that the interference should
serve a legitimate aim in the public interest. Taking into
account the wide margin of appreciation, in tax cases
this requirement is usually met. After all, the main aim
of taxation is in principle to provide the government
funds to finance its activities. Moreover, the third
sentence of Article 1 First Protocol indicates that
taxation does in principle not violate Article 1 First
Protocol, thus implying that prima facie happen taxation
serves a legitimate aim in the public interest. From case
law it can be deducted that the ECtHR passes this
requirement rather easily in retroactive tax cases and
focuses on the proportionality test.56 However, in the
Joubert case, the ECtHR did examine this requirement
and even ruled this requirement was not met. With all
due respect, I am of the opinion that this latter is
methodologically confusing. I will further discuss this
issue in the Joubert case in section 6.
5.5 Proportionality Test; Fair Balance
The main test in most cases examined under Article 1
First Protocol is the proportionality test. This also
applies for retroactive tax cases. With respect to the
proportionality test, the M.A. case is an important case
as the ECtHR provides some general considerations that
could also be of relevance for other cases. Here, I mainly
focus on these general considerations and less on the
details of the M.A. case itself. It should be noted that for
the special case of ‘legislative intervention’ a special
standard applies (see section 6).
A first general consideration in the M.A. case is that
‘the fact that the legislation applied retroactively in the
applicants’ case [does not] constitute per se a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as retrospective tax
legislation is not as such prohibited by that provision.’
This consideration has been repeated in other cases.57
The keynote that retroactive tax legislation is not as such
prohibited by that provision is noteworthy as it as a
point of departure deviates from the basic approach of
the Court of Justice (CJ) towards retroactivity in view
of the principle of legal certainty. The CJ applies a point
of departure that is reverse to a certain extent:
retroactivity is not allowed, unless ( . . . ).58
Secondly, after the ECtHR rules that M.A. did not
have an expectation protected by Article 1 EP, it notes
that so-called pure cases might have to be assessed
differently. It then considers: ‘In such a situation, ( . . . )
taxation at a considerably higher tax rate than that in
force on the date of the exercise of the stock options
could arguably be regarded as an unreasonable
interference with expectations protected by Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.’ This could be regarded as a warning to
the Member States. In recent case law of the ECtHR this
consideration is quoted in general terms: ‘taxation at a
considerably higher tax rate than that in force when the
revenue in question was generated could arguably be
regarded as an unreasonable interference with
expectations protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.59
Strikingly, in some cases in which the generalized
consideration is quoted, there is no retroactivity but at
most a kind of retrospectivity (in the words of the
ECtHR: ‘the taxation complained of can be argued to
have certain retroactive features’).60 This fact raises the
question what the scope of the consideration is and in
particular how the phrase ‘when the revenue in question
was generated’ should be interpreted (e.g., ‘generated’
according to the standards in the tax law, or ‘generated’
according to another – for example an economic or a
social – standard). Future jurisprudence should shed
more light on this issue.
A third general consideration is that ‘whether [the
retroactive application; MP] is compatible with Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 depends, first, on the reasons for the
55 See especially R.Sz., para. 43: ‘It considers that it is not necessary
to take a position on the legality of the impugned tax measures,
which concerned the applicant’s employment and severance pay,
both having occurred long before the entry force of the Act, since
this issue is taken into consideration under the proportionality
test’.
56 A.B.C. and D.; Building Societies; M.A.; Di Belmonte (no. 2); Di
Belmonte. I note that in the three cases with respect to the
Hungarian 98% tax on severance payments (NKM, Gáll and R.Sz.),
the ECtHR found that there were serious doubts that the
requirement of a legitimate aim was met. However, these doubts
even concerned the substantive tax rule (the 98% tax) itself.
57 Di Belmonte (no. 2); Di Belmonte, para. 42; ECtHR 23 February
2006, no. 25632/02, Stere and others v. Romania, para. 54; ECtHR
18 May 2010, no. 16021/02, Plalam S.P.A. v. Italy, para. 47.
Compare also the non-tax cases ECtHR 8 November 2005, no.
63134/00, Kechko v. Ukraine, para. 27 and ECtHR 8 November
2005, no. 4251/02, Saliba v. Malta, para. 39.
58 E.g., CJ (Grand Chamber) 26 April 2005, C-376/02, Stichting
‘Goed Wonen’ II, para. 33: ‘Although in general the principle of
legal certainty precludes a ( . . . ) measure from taking effect from
a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be
otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and
where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly
respected’.
59 NKM, para. 74; Gáll, para. 73; R.Sz., para. 59.
60 NKM and Gáll.
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retroactivity and, secondly, on the impact of the
retroactive law on the position of the applicants’. This is
an important consideration. First, here, not the taxation
itself – which constitutes the interference – is tested on
its proportionality, but the ECtHR specifically focuses on
the retroactive element.61 This implies that the ECtHR
considers the retroactivity as a special phenomenon that
should be scrutinized separately. Secondly, the
consideration provides national courts a framework,
albeit still rather abstract, for testing retroactive tax
legislation under Article 1 First Protocol.
It is not entirely clear from the reasoning in the M.A.
case what the exact relation is between the above-
mentioned second and third general consideration.
Taking into account the order of the considerations, one
could argue that for pure cases only the second general
consideration applies and that the third general
consideration is only applicable if the case at hand is not
a ‘pure case’. However, if this view is correct, this would
only shift the key issue, for one should need a criterion
to distinguish between pure cases and non-pure cases.
Furthermore, this view might imply that retroactivity in
a pure case is always prohibited, thus without taking
into account the reasons for retroactivity. I think this
would not be a desirable or a right approach, because in
my view the testing of retroactivity requires an
assessment of the legislator’s balancing of the interests
involved. I note that one could in reply argue that a case
only qualifies as a pure case where there is no
justification for the retroactivity. However, this would be
a rather purposeless addition, because then it would still
be necessary – for the qualification as ‘pure case’ – to
test whether in the case at hand the retroactivity is
justified. Against this background, I think the above-
mentioned third general consideration generally applies
for testing retroactivity, thus also in pure cases.
Nevertheless, obviously, in a pure case the conclusion
that retroactivity violates Article 1 First Protocol would
rather be reached than in a non-pure case.
In the M.A. case, the ECtHR has also provided some
additional guidelines with respect to the application of
the framework provided in the above-mentioned third
general consideration. With respect to the first part – the
reasons of the retroactivity – it is important that the
ECtHR accepts in the M.A. case the reasons for the
retroactivity after considering ‘that the assessment made
by the legislature in this respect cannot be regarded as
unreasonable’. Thus, the standard is that the legislature’s
assessment will be accepted ‘unless it is devoid of
reasonable foundation’.
As the number of cases in which the ECtHR judged
retroactive taxation is rather small, it is hard to say what
kind of reasons for retroactivity could be considered
legitimate. Nonetheless, I agree with Baker that from
case law it can be deducted that if the reason for
retroactive taxation is to counteract tax avoidance, the
ECtHR will not readily judge that the retroactive
taxation violates Article 1 First Protocol.62 After all, the
ECtHR upheld the retroactive tax legislation concerned
in the A.B.C. and D. case (tax avoidance; artificial tax
losses), the Building Societies case (taking advantage of a
loophole; frustrating the intention of the Parliament)
and the M.A. case (escaping the application of an
announced change in tax law). So, targeting tax
avoidance is accepted as a legitimate reason.
Interestingly, in the M.A. case the ECtHR also accepts
the connection the Finnish government ties between the
prevention of the tax avoidance and ensuring equal
treatment of taxpayers (i.e., equal treatment in
comparison with those who did not try to escape the
application of the amendment). Another accepted reason
is to remedy technical deficiencies of the law in order to
prevent that taxpayers enjoy the benefit of a windfall.63
This latter reason is even ascended to a ‘general
principle’.64 Although there is no clearly confirming
jurisprudence of the ECtHR yet, I expect that other
legitimate reasons could under circumstances be the
prevention of so-called announcement effects65 (see also
hereinafter with respect to ‘legislation by press release’),
and to clarify an obscurity in the tax legislation, e.g., for
the purpose of legal certainty, for example by means of a
so-called interpretative statute.66
With respect to the second part – the impact of the
measure –, the ECtHR considers in the M.A. case ‘that
the legislation was not such as to amount to confiscatory
taxation or of such a nature as could deprive the
legislation of its character as a tax law’. These elements
refer among others to the financial impact. I think that
in this respect also the particular (financial) situation of
the individual could be of relevance; therefore, it might
be that this test has different outcomes for various
individuals. Furthermore, I think that one should not
deduce from the quoted consideration that the two
elements are the only elements that are relevant to assess
61 Also in some other cases the court focuses on the retroactivity
when testing the proportionality; see A.B.C. and D.; Building
Societies, paras 80–83. In the R.Sz. case, the element of
retroactivity is one of the various distinguished elements on the
basis of which the ECtHR concludes that the proportionality test is
not met.
62 Baker 2005, p. 8: ‘legislation which is designed to counter a
particular tax avoidance arrangement will be very hard to challenge
on grounds that it is unjustified’. See also J. Tiley, ‘Human rights
and taxpayers’, The Cambridge Journal (1998), p. 273 and Loomer
2006, p. 80.
63 Building Societies, para. 81.
64 See NKM, paras 51 and 74, and R.Sz., paras 40 and 59.
65 Compare also the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court 2 October
2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI1909, para. 3.5.4.
66 Retroactive interpretative statutes are not uncommon in tax
legislation; see Gribnau/Pauwels 2013, General report, pp. 47–50
and 57. See on this subject e.g., Bruno Peeters and Patricia
Popelier, ‘Retroactive interpretative statutes and validation statutes
in tax law: an assessment in the light of legal certainty, seperation
of powers, and the right to a fair trial’, in: Gribnau/Pauwels 2013,
pp. 117–128.
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the impact. In my view, another relevant element is
whether or not legitimate expectations are infringed by
the retroactivity.67 Related, a relevant element could be
whether or not, relying on the then applicable tax law,
the taxpayer already spent income concerned, unaware
that at a later moment the income would be subject to
retroactive taxation.68
I note with respect to these two latter elements that it
is of relevance whether the government announced the
change in legislation and the retroactive effect of it
(sometimes called ‘legislation by press release’69). In case
such an announcement is sufficiently clear and the
retroactivity does not go beyond the date of the
announcement, I am of the opinion that in principle the
retroactivity is foreseeable and therefore in principle no
legitimate expectations are infringed by the retroactivity.
So, in that case, there is in principle no violation of
Article 1 First Protocol, provided that there are also
legitimate reasons for the retroactivity (often: preventing
announcement effects). To my knowledge, the ECtHR
has not yet confirmed this view, but I expect it will do so
if such a case is brought to court, taking into account the
perspective of comparative law. First, in various Member
States this technique of ‘legislating by press release’ is
regularly used in the tax area.70 Secondly, from the
ruling of the CJ in the Stichting Goed Wonen II case it
can be deduced that the CJ accepts that this technique
could prevent that retroactivity leads to an infringement
of legitimate expectations, provided that the
announcement concerned is sufficiently clear for
taxpayers.71 In that case, the CJ also accepted that the
aim to prevent announcement effects (in that case: the
effect that – if the retroactive effect was not announced –
contrived financial arrangements would be put into
operation between the time at which it was announced
that the law would be amended and the time at which
that amendment came into force) could be a legitimate
reason to justify the retroactive effect, provided that the
risk of announcement effects was significant enough.72
To be sure, the aforementioned discussion with
respect to ‘legislation by press release’ does not imply
that if the retroactive tax legislation is not properly
announced in advance, the retroactivity necessarily
violates Article 1 First Protocol. To the contrary, there
are various cases in which the ECtHR upheld the
retroactivity of the tax legislation although the
retroactive effect went beyond the date of the first
announcement of the retroactive effect.73
To end, provide a short overview of the judgments of
the ECtHR and of the earlier EComHR in the various
cases under the fair balance test. As mentioned before,
the court upheld retroactive tax legislation in the A.B.C.
and D. case, the Building Societies case and the M.A.
case. Also in the Di Belmonte (no. 2) case, the ECtHR
held that the impugned taxation met the fair balance
test. Interestingly, in the other Di Belmonte case, the
ECtHR ruled that the taxation did not met the fair
balance test and thus that there was a violation of Article
1 First Protocol. However, it should be noted that the
key ground for the judgment is not the quasi-retroactive
effect74 of the tax legislation involved. The decisive issue
was that there had been a delay in the payment of the
compensation by the Italian authorities to the applicant
for the expropriation.75 If the compensation would have
been paid regularly and in a timely manner, the
compensation would have fallen outside the temporal
scope of the new tax legislation. In the Joubert case –
with respect to a procedural issue (legislative validation
of a tax assessment issued by incompetent authorities) –
the ECtHR found that the fair balance test was not met.
However, this case is special as it concerns legislative
intervention pending legal proceedings (see section 6).
In the recent R.Sz. case, the ECtHR ruled that the
retroactive 98% taxation on the severance payment
violated Article 1 First Protocol. However, in this case
the retroactivity is just one of the elements on the basis
of which the ECtHR reaches its conclusion. More
important is that it seems that the ECtHR does not like
the substantive tax provision itself (so obviously, a
fortiori, neither the retroactive effect of it). This view is
supported by the fact that the ECtHR also held that
there was violation of Article 1 First Protocol in the
NKM case, concerning the same legislation but in which
case there was no retroactive effect (in the case of NKM
both the dismissal and the payment of the severance
occurred after the introduction of the 98% tax on
severance payments) but at most retrospective effect (in
the wording of the ECtHR: it had ‘certain retroactive
features’).
Summarizing, there have been some cases involving
(quasi-)retroactive taxation in which the ECtHR found
that the fair balance test was not met. However, all these
cases have in common that not the retroactivity as such
was the key obstacle according to the ECtHR. In each of
these cases there were (additional) special circumstances
explaining the judgment that Article 1 First Protocol was
67 Compare the approach of the CJ when testing retroactive tax
legislation for compatibility with the principle of legal certainty;
e.g., CJ (Grand Chamber) 26 April 2005, C-376/02, Stichting
‘Goed Wonen’ II, para. 33. Compare also the ruling of the Dutch
Supreme Court 2 October 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI1909, para.
3.5.2–3.5.3.
68 Compare R.Sz., para. 59.
69 Gribnau/Pauwels 2013, General report, pp. 55–57.
70 Gribnau/Pauwels 2013, General report, pp. 55–57. See on this
subject e.g., Pauwels 2009, pp. 230–245, Robert Påhlsson,
‘Retroactivity: Swedish Practice on Legislation by Governmental
Communication’, Intertax (2011), pp. 271–276 and Hey 2013.
71 CJ (Grand Chamber) 26 April 2005, C-376/02, Stichting ‘Goed
Wonen’ II, paras 43–44.
72 CJ (Grand Chamber) 26 April 2005, C-376/02, Stichting ‘Goed
Wonen’ II, paras 38–39.
73 A.B.C. and D; Building Societies, M.A.
74 Strictly speaking this case did not concern retroactivity but
retrospectivity; see section 3.2.
75 See especially para. 45 of the Di Belmonte case. Compare also a
contrario the result of the Di Belmonte (no. 2) case.
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violated (Di Belmonte: delay in payment; Joubert:
intervention pending legal proceedings; R.Sz.:
substantive provision itself is problematic). Against this
background and taking into account the other
aforementioned cases involving retroactive taxation, it
can be concluded that up till now the ECtHR has not yet
concluded in a tax case that there is a violation of Article
1 First Protocol due to the retroactive effect itself.
6 THE PARTICULAR SITUATION OF LEGISLATIVE
INTERVENTION PENDING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
The ECtHR applies a stricter standard towards
retroactivity, including retroactivity in the tax area, in a
particular type of situation. This concerns the situation
where the retroactive law decisively influences pending
legal proceedings before court (hereinafter also:
legislative intervention). Initially, the ECtHR applied a
standard without exceptions. It ruled that ‘the principle
of the rule of law and the notion of fair trial enshrined in
Article 6 ( . . . ) preclude any interference by the
legislature with the administration of justice designed to
influence the judicial determination of the dispute’.76 It
seems that due to the tax case Building Societies it
became apparent to the court that this rule was too
strict.77 In this case, the ECtHR accepted the justification
provided by the government for the legislative
intervention.78 After the judgment in the Building
Societies the standard became that ‘the principle of the
rule of law and the notion of fair trial enshrined in
Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature –
other than on compelling grounds of the general interest
– with the administration of justice designed to
influence the judicial determination of a dispute.’79 Due
to the subordinate clause between dashes, the issue has
become a matter of balancing instead of an issue
governed by a hard and fast rule. Obviously, the
subsequent question is which kind of grounds could be
regarded as compelling. This question demands a
separate analysis, since there is quite a lot of case law on
this issue and it is hard to deduct general lines from it.80
Here, I only focus on case law with respect to tax cases.
In that respect, it should first of all be noted that the
afore-mentioned standard does not only apply in the
sphere of Article 6 ECHR – which provision is not
applicable to pure tax cases81 – but also in the sphere of
Article 1 First Protocol.82 As a consequence, the
standard is also of relevance for tax cases under the
scrutiny for compatibility with Article 1 First Protocol.83
To my knowledge, the most important tax cases
concerning a legislative intervention during pending
legal proceedings are the Building Societies case and the
Joubert case.
The Building Societies case is an important case, since
the ECtHR accepted the legislative intervention by the
UK legislator.84 In this case the UK legislator had
introduced retroactive legislation to prevent that
taxpayers would make an advantage of a technical
deficiency in the tax law arisen by a changeover to a new
tax-payment regime and would enjoy the benefit of a
windfall. The judgment of the ECtHR was based on
various considerations, but an essential issue appears to
be that the applicants had tried to make an advantage of
the loophole, which the ECtHR apparently did not
appreciate at all.85
The Joubert case concerned the situation that a
certain division of the French tax authorities performed
tax audits at the applicant and subsequently issued tax
assessments, including penalties. For the national court
the applicants took the position that this division was
not the competent authority for these acts. However,
pending the legal proceedings a law was enacted
implying that such kind of acts were considered regular,
as a result of which at the end the applicant lost his case
for the national court. The ECtHR ruled that this
legislative intervention violates Article 1 First Protocol. A
remarkable part of the judgment concerns the test
whether the interference serves a legitimate aim in the
public interest.86 According to the ECtHR, the aim
invoked by the French government was actually to
preserve the budgetary interest, which interest however
does not qualify as a legitimate aim. This latter decision
was based amongst others on the consideration that in
principle the mere budgetary interest cannot justify a
76 ECtHR 9 December 1994, no. 13427/87, Stran Greek Refineries
and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, para. 49.
77 See for this position also e.g., P. van Dijk and others (ed.), Theory
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights,
(Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2006), p. 592.
78 See in particular para. 112 of the Building Societies case.
79 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 28 October 1999, nos. 24846/94 and
34165/96 to 34173/96, Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and
Others v. France, para. 57. See also e.g., ECtHR (Grand Chamber)
29 March 2006, no. 36813/97, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1), para. 126,
and ECtHR 8 December 2011, no. 5631/05, Althoff and Others v.
Germany, para. 67.
80 See on this subject of legislative intervention comprehensively A.
Jasiak, Constitutional constraints on ad hoc legislation, (Nijmegen,
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010) as well as Peter A. Gerangelos, The
Seperation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Judicial Process,
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009).
81 ECtHR 12 July 2001, no. 44759/98, Ferrazzini v. Italy. This case
law has been criticized in the literature by many; see e.g., Natalie
Lee, ‘Time for Ferrazzini to be reviewed?’, British Tax Review
(2010), pp. 589–609.
82 ECtHR 8 November 2005, no. 4251/02, Saliba v. Malta, para. 39.
Compare also ECtHR 14 February 2006, no. 67847/01,
Lecarpentier and other v. France, paras 47–48.
83 Joubert, paras 57–69.
84 Building Societies, paras 100–113. For completeness’ sake, I note
that, although this is in substance a tax case, remarkably, the
ECtHR tests the legislative intervention against Art. 6 ECHR
(besides testing against Art. 1 First Protocol).
85 See phrases such as ‘launched their proceedings ( . . .) in order to
take advantage of the loophole’, ‘substantial amount of already
collected revenue to be lost on a technicality’, ‘those proceedings
must be considered to have been attempt to benefit from the
vulnerability of the authorities’ situation’, and ‘the applicant
societies in their efforts to frustrate the intention of the Parliament’.
86 Joubert, paras 57–64.
RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION IN VIEW OF ARTICLE 1 FIRST PROTOCOL ECHR
EC TAX REVIEW 2013/6 279
retroactive intervention by a validation statute (‘qu’en
principe ce seul intérêt financier ne permet pas de
justifier l’intervention rétroactive d’une loi de
validation’) and the consideration that the French
government had not taken the position that the loss of
the amount of revenue at stake (about 1.1 billion francs
for all legal proceedings) would have such an impact on
the government’s budget that the public interest would
be affected. With all due respect, in my opinion this
decision is methodologically confusing. Taking into
account the wide margin of appreciation granted to the
national authorities in the tax area under the legitimate
aim test and the fact that the notion of ‘public interest’ is
extensive (see section 4), it is, in my opinion, hard to see
that, in a tax matter, a budgetary interest is considered
not being a legitimate aim in the public interest. To be
sure, this position does not imply that I do not agree
with the opinion of the ECtHR that the mere budgetary
interest does not justify the legislative intervention.
However, in my opinion, it would be more appropriate
to conceive this standard as a matter of balancing, i.e.,
that the mere budgetary interest does not outweigh the
interests infringed by the legislative intervention. Being a
matter of balancing, this principle better fits under the
proportionality test rather than under the legitimate aim
test.87 As a matter of fact, the ECtHR also applied this
proportionality test as an alternative reasoning in the
Joubert case to condemn the legislative intervention,88
which reasoning is thus in my view more convincing.
An explanation for the methodological remarkable
approach by the ECtHR is that the afore-mentioned
standard that in principle the mere budgetary interest
cannot justify a retroactive intervention by a validation
statute, originates from the above-mentioned case law
with respect to legislative intervention. It is true that in
that connection this standard is settled case law,89 but it
should be noted that this standard was originally
provided when testing for compatibility with Article 6
ECHR and within the framework that only compelling
grounds of the general interest could justify a legislative
intervention. In this respect, it should be noted that the
adjective ‘compelling’ refers to weighing. Therefore, in
my view, when this consideration is transposed from the
test under Article 6 ECHR to the test under Article 1
First Protocol, the standard better fits under the
proportionality test.
Besides these methodological remarks, also the
substantive decision as such in the Joubert case that the
mere budgetary interest cannot justify the legislative
intervention is noteworthy, just because this standard is
confirmed in a tax case. Furthermore, it should however
be noted that a budgetary interest is not in any case
disallowed as a ground to justify a legislative
intervention. First of all, the ECtHR considers that ‘in
principle’ the mere budgetary interest cannot justify a
legislative intervention. This ‘in principle’ leaves room
for exceptions. I estimate that the mere budgetary
interest could qualify as a compelling ground of the
general interest if the impact on the government’s
budget is so substantial that the public interest would be
affected. Secondly, if there are also other reasons for the
legislative intervention besides the budgetary interest,
the budgetary interest could be taken into consideration
– together with the other reasons – to assess whether the
legislative intervention is justified by compelling ground
of the general interest.90
Another issue is that the decision in the Joubert case
raises the question whether the conclusion should be
that in tax cases a legislative intervention influencing
pending legal proceedings always violates Article 1 First
Protocol. After all, it could be argued that in tax cases
reasons for a legislative intervention would likely to have
in essence a financial nature. The above-mentioned
Building Societies case shows however that this
conclusion is not right. Although one could argue that
the various reasons provided by the UK government in
the end can be reduced to the budgetary interest, the
ECtHR accepted the reasons and upheld the legislative
intervention in that case.
Nevertheless, I agree with Baker that the deviating
judgments in the Building Societies case and in the
Joubert case are noteworthy.91 In that connection, I also
wonder whether the decision in the Joubert case would
have been different if the French government had also
brought forward other arguments to justify the
legislative intervention, such as the argument that the
legislative intervention was necessary to preserve that
taxpayers would have obtained the benefit of a windfall
due to the mere fact that a non-competent authority
executed the acts involved, and/or to ensure an equal tax
treatment in comparison with taxpayers by whom the
competent authority issued the tax assessments. Other
than Baker,92 I do not think that an explanation for the
deviating judgments is that the Joubert case concerns a
procedural tax matter, while the Building Societies case
concerns a substantive tax matter. Perhaps a key
difference is that in the Building Societies case the
applicants actively sought to exploit the loophole and
tried to frustrate the original intentions of Parliament,
87 Compare e.g., ECtHR 20 November 1995, no. 17849/91, Pressos
Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, paras 37 and 43.
88 Joubert, paras 65–68.
89 See e.g., ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 28 October 1999, nos. 24846/
94 and 34165/96 to 34173/96, Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez
and Others v. France, para. 59, ECtHR 14 February 2006, no.
67847/01, Lecarpentier and other v. France, para. 47, and ECtHR
9 January 2007, nos. 31501/03, etc., Aubert and others v. France,
para. 84. Compare also ECtHR 20 November 1995, no. 17849/91,
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, para. 43.
90 For example, in the Building Societies case the ECtHR took into
account also the budgetary interest where it upheld the legislative
intervention.
91 Philip Baker, ‘Some Recent Decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights’, European Taxation (2009), p. 597.
92 Baker 2009, p. 597.
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whilst in the Joubert case it just happened to the
applicant that incompetent authorities issued the
assessment.
7 CONCLUSION
Two research questions have been formulated. The first
question is in which way the ECtHR’s assessment of
retroactive tax legislation in a specific case fits within the
general framework that the ECtHR uses to assess
measures for compatibility with Article 1 First Protocol.
An important result of the analysis concerns the
foreseeability requirement under the lawfulness test.
One might expect that there is a strain relation between
retroactive tax legislation and the requirement, that an
individual must be able to foresee the consequences
which a given action may entail. However, up until now,
the ECtHR has not clearly tested retroactive tax
legislation against the foreseeability requirement under
the lawfulness test. From case law it can be deducted
that the main test for the compatibility of retroactive
taxation under Article 1 First Protocol is whether the
proportionality requirement is met.
The second research question is which basic
guidelines with respect to retroactive tax legislation can
be deducted from the case law of the ECtHR. The
analysis shows that one should distinguish between the
particular situation in which the retroactive application
has the effect that pending legal proceedings are
decisively influenced, and other situations of the
application of retroactive tax legislation.
With respect to the latter situations, it is important
that the ECtHR ruled that retroactive tax legislation is
not as such prohibited by Article 1 First Protocol.
Nonetheless, the ECtHR apparently considers retroactive
taxation as a special situation, since it particularly
scrutinizes the retroactive element. Whether retroactive
taxation is in compliance with Article 1 First Protocol
depends, first, on the reasons for the retroactivity and,
secondly, on the impact of the retroactive law on the
position of the applicants. With respect to the reasons,
the ECtHR accepts the legislature’s assessment unless it
is devoid of reasonable foundation. From case law it can
be deducted that if the reason for retroactive taxation is
to counteract tax avoidance, the ECtHR will not readily
judge that the retroactive taxation violates Article 1 First
Protocol. Another accepted reason is to remedy technical
deficiencies of the law in order to prevent that taxpayers
enjoy the benefit of a windfall. I expect that other
legitimate reasons could under circumstances be the
prevention of so-called announcement effects and to
clarify an obscurity in the tax legislation, e.g., for the
purpose of legal certainty. With respect to the impact of
the measure, the ECtHR tests whether the legislation is
such as to amount to confiscatory taxation or of such a
nature as could deprive the legislation of its character as
a tax law. I think that in this respect also the particular
(financial) situation of the individual could be of
relevance. Furthermore, in my view, another relevant
element is whether or not legitimate expectations are
infringed by the retroactivity. Related, a relevant element
could be whether or not the taxpayer already spent the
income concerned, unaware that at a later moment the
income would be subject to retroactive taxation. With
respect to these two latter elements, I think it could also
be of relevance whether the government announced the
change in legislation and the retroactive effect of it in
advance. To end, although the afore-mentioned indicates
that the national tax legislators are left a substantial
margin of appreciation with respect to retroactivity, it
should be noted that the ECtHR has also provided a
warning by considering in general terms that taxation at
a considerably higher tax rate than that in force when
the revenue in question was generated could arguably be
regarded as an unreasonable interference with
expectations protected by Article 1 First Protocol.
Future jurisprudence should shed more light on the
issue how this consideration should be interpreted and
how it corresponds to the afore-mentioned other
considerations.
With respect to the situation in which the retroactive
application has the effect that pending legal proceedings
are decisively influenced, the ECtHR applies a stricter
standard. Such an interference is not allowed unless
there are compelling grounds of the general interest. In
this respect it is important that the ECtHR ruled, also in
a tax case, that in principle the mere budgetary interest
cannot justify such a legislative intervention. This
however does not imply that in tax cases a legislative
intervention is always incompatible with Article 1 First
Protocol ECHR. For example, in the Building Societies
case, the ECtHR upheld the legislative intervention
which was aimed to prevent that the taxpayers could
benefit from a technical loophole and would enjoy a
windfall profit.
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